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Abstract
We present a new methodology to study how upstream (e.g. producers) and downstream (e.g.
transiters) players form coalitions, bargain over joint profit sharing and invest. Within coalitions
players combine resources, coalitions compete on a market. Profit of each coalition depends on the
cooperation among the outside players. Hence, we consider a game with externalities. To find the
equilibrium coalition structure and the expected payoffs, we use the solution proposed by Maskin
(2003). Payoffs reflect the bargaining power and depend on capacities of players. We show, how
investment options available to players matter.
We apply the study to analyze the Eurasian gas supply network. Russia and Turkmenistan -
producers and Ukraine, Belorus, Azerbaijan, Iran - transiters form coalitions to supply gas and
bargain over profit sharing. Besides, the players invest in pipelines. We derive the bargaining
power of the countries from the architecture of the network and calculate the strategic value of the
different pipeline projects.
Keywords: Partition Function, Coalitional Bargaining, Coalition Formation, Externalities, Gas
Supply
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1 Introduction
In various industries presented by upstream and downstream players, let us refer to them as pro-
ducers and transiters. Players cooperate, that is form coalitions, to deliver goods to the market.
On the market coalitions compete. The outcome profit of every coalition depends on the coalitions
formed by the outside players and capacities available to the coalitions. The profits are shared
among coalition members according to their contributions. Contribution determine the bargain-
ing power of a player and depends on his capacities. Therefore, players select investment options
strategically as to increase the bargaining power and therewith the share in profit.
In this paper we address the three interrelated questions: how do coalitions form, how do players
bargain over joint profit sharing and how do they choose investment options? These questions are
relevant to a number of industries, such as natural gas, telecommunications, electricity, transport,
and water. In this paper we introduce and test the novel methodology to analyze endogenous
coalition formation, bargaining in the presence of externalities and strategic investing problems.
Our study was induced by the lack of analytical instrument to analyze and predict the devel-
opment of the situation in the Eurasian gas supply network. The network formed by the Former
Soviet Union Republics, who produce and deliver gas to the European market. The cooperative and
investment decisions of the network players are directly affect the European gas market. Natural
gas consumption in Europe is growing while the domestic gas production is declining. By 2015 over
65% of the total gas consumption in EU15 will be covered by external producers. Algeria, Norway
and African Republics promise to contribute about 55% of the import needs of Europe. The rest of
the import demand should be supplied by the Former Soviet Union (FSU) producers. To reach the
European border, gas of the FSU producers passes through a number of transit countries. Then,
the issues of cooperation between producers and transiters and investments in transport capacities
arise.
Currently, Russia is the only exporter of gas from the Former Soviet region. To deliver its gas
to Europe Russia uses the network of pipelines running through the territories of Ukraine and
Byelorussia. Thus, we say Russia forms a coalition with two transiters - Ukraine and Byelorussia.
For long time Russia has considered investment projects to increase the transport capacities of these
countries. That would be the cheapest and fastest possibility to increase supply capacities. Yet,
very recently Russia has started building a new pipeline through the Baltic sea, the most expensive
of all the investment options. The new pipeline will enable Russia to deliver its gas directly to
European borders, bypassing both transiters. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has
experienced problems negotiating contracts with its transiters. The Baltic pipeline is designed to
strengthen Russia’s bargaining position with Ukraine and Byelorussia.
Other FSU Republics, namely the Caspian Republics, intend to enter the European market.
At present all Caspian export pipelines run through Russia. Thus, the cooperation with Russia
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is crucial. Yet, the Caspian producers experience difficulties in negotiations of transit contracts.
To avoid additional competition, Russia blocks the access to the European market. Recently the
European Union and the USA have encouraged Caspian producers to bypass Russia. Trans-Caspian
pipeline, through Azerbaijan and Georgia, and Nabucco pipeline via Iran have been designed to
bring the Caspian gas to Europe. The pipelines require huge investment capital, but still are waiting
for realization. Despite the costs, the pipeline projects will strengthen the bargaining power of the
Caspian producers vis-a-vis Russia and raise the profits.
Our analysis is aimed to understand the rational behind the developments in the Eurasian gas
network. In particular, we intend to explain the choice of investment options based on the strategic
insight. Why producers invest in expensive options and abandon more efficient investment projects?
In addition, we find the impact of the network development on the market. We estimate the gas
prices and quantities set by the supply coalitions of the Eurasian gas supply network.
We build a framework for our analysis on game theory concepts. We consider, that coalition
formation and profit sharing among the players are essentially bargaining situations. Therefore,
we use a model of coalitional bargaining to describe the interactions of the network players. Ex-
ternalities, appeared with possibilities to form competing coalitions, precludes a solution of the
bargaining game in a characteristic function form. Thus, we can not apply the solution concepts
of Shapley (1953) and Owen (1976).2 Instead we have to describe the game in so-called the parti-
tion function form. A partition function allows to capture the presence of externalities. It assigns
the profit to coalitions with respect to the partition, or the coalition structure of players. Several
solution concepts has been proposed for partition function form games. The problem of bargaining
with externalities can be solved as an extensive form game, e.g. Bloch (1996), Ray, Vohra (1996),
Gomes (2001), or with axiomatic approaches, e.g. Do, Norde (2002), Maskin (2003), Ju (2004). In
this paper we apply the axiomatic solution proposed by Maskin (2003). In contrast to the other
axiomatic approaches, the approach by Maskin (2003) allows simultaneously determine the equi-
librium coalition structure and the corresponding payoffs to players.3 The set of axioms impose
desirable properties on the final solution, which make the results tractable.4
The number of players in the Eurasian gas network is relatively small. A fair body of data about
the future gas demand on the European market enables us to calibrate the demand function. The
technology of gas production and pipelines is well known, so that we can estimate production,
transportation, and investment costs of gas supply. Thus, we have an opportunity to provide a
numerical analysis of the Eurasian gas network. We calculate expected payoffs to the players,
2These solutions imply, that a value of a coalition is determined once a coalition is established and is not affected
by allocation of outsiders.
3In contrast, Do, Norde (2002) and Ju (2004) proposed procedures to calculate expected payoffs of the players.
Yet, they assumed the grand coalition including all the players always forms, and thus, neglect the question of a
coalition structure.
4This fact makes the approach of Maskin (2003) more attractable in comparison against extensive form approaches.
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determine the equilibrium coalition structure and investments.5 Hence, the European gas network
provides a rather unique opportunity to confront the theoretical solution of game theory with real
world experience. In this respect we can compare how the theoretical predictions correspond to
the real behavior of players in the network.
Our quantitative analysis we show how investments affect the balance of bargaining power in the
network. In particular, we quantify the importance of different pipelines for the bargaining power
of players. Our results confirm the importance of outside options to strengthen the bargaining
power. That explains, why Russia has invested into the expensive North European Gas pipeline
and why the Caspian producers intend to build the expensive pipelines bypassing Russia. At the
same time we reveal, the bargaining advantage of the transiters vis-a-vis the producers if no bypass
is possible. The investments in capacities of the transiters do not bring any strategic benefit to
the producers, but can only weaken their bargaining position. This fact explains, why Russia
postpones its investment in the Upgrade of the Ukrainian transmission system and the Yamal
pipeline in Belorus.
The present analysis continues the research of Hubert & Ikonnikova (2003, 2004). They have
derived the bargaining power of players of the network endogenously from the architecture of the
network and so do we. Yet, Hubert & Ikonnikova (2003, 2004) have considered the network with only
one producer. This excludes externality from the consideration and allows to use Shapley (1953)
and Owen(1976) concepts to solve the bargaining problem. We extend their work by considering
a network, where several competing coalitions may form. Our work also relates to the papers
on gas market, e.g. Grais & Zheng (1996), von Hirschhausen & Meinhart & Pavel (2005), and
Holz & Kalashnikov (2005). These papers consider the relation between Russia and its transiters
and assume, that the producer has all the bargaining power. This again puts aside the issues of
competition, externalities and coalition formation.
From a standpoint of a general bargaining problem with externalities, our work relates to studies
on other topics. Thus, Eyckmans, Tulkens (2001) explore the issue of Kyoto protocol, where players
are countries and externalities are emissions affecting the environment of others. Jehiel, Moldovanu
(1996) study a patent acquisition problem, when oligopoly firms collude to buy an innovation from
a rival. Fridolfsson, Stennek (2002) analyze preemptive mergers, where firms merge with the hope
of avoiding the negative externalities of being an ”outsider” of the deal. At last, Calvert, Dietz
(1998) consider the formation of political parties. A variety of solution concepts is used to model
the problems above and the approach of Maskin (2003) can be applied to any. However, to our
knowledge, our work is the first attempt to use the solution of Maskin (2003).
The current paper has a number of issues left for further research. First, we do not explicitly
model the interaction of the gas exporters, such as Norway and Algeria, on the European market.
5We use data on gas industry and European gas market gathered in Hubert & Ikonnikova (2003).
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Rather, we estimate a residual demand for gas from the Former Soviet Union. Second, we assume
that the players can credibly commit to the long term agreements. Most of investment cost in
capacities are sunk, therefore, the relevant question is, whether the players can commit to long-
term cooperation contracts or they are prone to renegotiate their payoffs to extract quasirents. At
last, as the data on demand and supply do not allow for a proper econometrical estimation, we
stick to linear form of the functions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the situation in
the Eurasian gas supply network and introduce the players and investment options. Therewith
we provide a base for the formal model presented in Section 3. Then Section 4 gives quantitative
assumptions, which we use further in empirical analysis. The results of our calculations and their
interpretation we present in Section 5. Section 6 consists of further discussion and conclusions.
2 Players and options in the network
The Eurasian gas supply network serves to deliver gas produced by the Former Soviet Union
Republics to Europe. At present, the network consists of only three players: Russia, Ukraine and
Byelorussia.6 Four other players may join the network in the nearest future. Turkmenistan plans
to export its gas to Europe in cooperation with Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Iran.7 Hereafter we call
the countries involved in the gas supply network players.
The European gas market is covered by the long-term bilateral ”take-or-pay” contracts. These
contracts are signed between a producer and a buyer for a period of 15 to 25 years. They fix the
price, the buyer is obliged to pay, and the quantities of gas, the producer is obliged to deliver
within a contracted period.8 Thus, contracts allocate the price risk to producers and the volume
risk to buyers. The long-term commitments on quantities allow producers to insure heavy up-font
investment costs to develop the production and transport infrastructures.
Hence, it is the producers, who have to tackle the transportation issues, including transit relations
and coordination of investments in transport capacity.9 Transiters are often presented by foreign
6For the countries considered in our study, the companies engaged in gas trade are state monopolists, therefore
we will refer to countries names instead of company names, e.g. Russia instead of Gazprom.
7We exclude from the consideration EU transit countries, like Poland, Slovakia, or Czech Republic. Most of the
EU members are under the regulation of the Energy Treaty. The agreement obliges its members to grant a third
party access to transit pipelines on a fair tariff. For other transit countries, namely Turkey, we assume, that it is on
their interest to commit and not to distort transit.
8A buyer is obliged to pay for quantities contracted if gas is not taken. On the other hand, producers commit
to a limited price change, which may be caused by oil prices rise. Stoppard (1996) and Asch, Osmundsen, Tveteras
(2000) discuss ”take-or-pay” contracts in more detail.
9Although gas buyers often contribute investment capital, they stay away from the supply and transit issues as
such. See ”Energy Information Administration” on http://www.eia.doe.gov for more information on international
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countries. No international court system exist at present to resolve the conflicts among gas supply
parties. Therefore, all conflicts concerning transit contracts are resolved through bargaining. At
Figure 1: The Eurasian gas supply network
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present only Russia exports gas and signs contracts with Europe. Fields of other Former Soviet
Republics, producing gas for export, are connected to export pipelines through the Russian system
of pipelines (see Figure 1). Hence, Russia has control over all gas export from the region. After the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia blocked its potential rivals from the European market. Until
now it has enjoyed a monopoly position in the region.
To deliver gas from the Soviet Union to the European market a system of pipelines running
through Ukraine, Ukold, was built in late 60’s. Until the late 90’s Ukraine has remained the
only transiter of gas to Europe. In the Soviet times decisions upon export quantities, investments
in transport capacities and export profit sharing were made and financed centrally. Republics
were a single whole, no distinction between transiter and producer existed, and coordination of
pipeline investment projects.
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supply was not an issue. Export profits were distributed according a complex system of inner
Republics exchange.10 After the collapse, newly independent countries had to build a new system
of relations. Ukraine started bargaining over its share in export profit. Having control over the
only transit route, it was in a very strong bargaining position with Russia. Russia had to give up
almost a half of its export profits.11 Yet, Ukraine has demanded for higher transit fees.12 To fulfill
its export obligations Russia would have had to agree on new terms.
To strengthen its bargaining position and gain a leverage on Ukraine, Russia decided to diversify
its transit routes. In 1994 Russia started building an alternative pipeline, which should have
delivered its gas to Europe bypassing Ukraine. Y amal1 pipeline was put into operation in 1998.
The pipeline run through Byelorussia and Poland and brought Russian gas to the German border.
The pipeline had the capacity of 28bcm/a vs. the Ukrainian 70bcm/a. Yet, the second parallel
band, called Y amal2, was planned to double the capacity. The project was aimed to weaken
the bargaining power of Ukraine and secure the position of Russia. After the dissolution of the
Union, the economics of Belorus was in decline and highly dependent on Russian subsidies. Poland
intended to join the European Union and developed a reputation of a reliable partner. Therefore
Russia relied on the ability of its new transiters to commit. Yet, after the Y amal1 started the
transmission of gas, Byelorussia initiated renegotiations over a payment for the transit.13 The
strained relations deterred Russia from increase capacity on the Yamal track. Russia again found
itself in a vulnerable position.
Meantime, by 2003 Ukraine and Russia reached a tentative agreement. Ukraine agreed to grant
Russia control over the transit capacities. Russia promised to attract investments to upgrade and
extend the old Ukrainian system. The Upgrade project was aimed to raise the carrying capacity by
15bcm/a, the further extension was to add 35bcm/a more. Until now the Upgrade project remains
the cheapest way to increase the capacity of the network. However, Russia has had to turn down
the option, after Ukraine has refused to fix Russia’s the control rights on a long-term basis.
At last, in 2005 Russia have chosen a project to extend the transit capacity of the network. Of
all the alternatives it chose the most expensive project of a North European Gas pipeline, NEGP .
The pipeline will bring Russian gas through the Baltic sea directly to Germany. Investment costs
10Often the pecuniary profit was left in Russia and other Republics were paid in kind for their participation in
supply. For history of FSU Republics’ relations in the context of gas trade see Stern (1996, 2005).
11Russia export over 50bcm/a of gas to Ukraine for internal consumption. Until the year of 2000 Russia set for
Ukraine a special low price of about 40$/tcm. That was more than two times less, than the price of gas in Europe.
Thus, Russia paid 2.7$/tcm fee in terms of gas for transit of over 100bcm/a to Europe.
12Ukraine was unable to pay for the quantities consumed and accumulated a large debt of $1.4bn. In response on
nonpayments, Russia reduced its export to Ukraine, but that led to unauthorized syphoning of gas from the export
pipeline by Ukraine. To solve its financial problem Ukraine negotiated a higher transit fees ex post.
13Similar to Ukraine, Belorus wanted to receive more financial support from Russia, in terms of subsidies, negotiated
a higher transit fees ex post.
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on this offshore pipeline are twice as high as on any of onshore pipelines, e.g. Upgrade or Y amal2.
Therefore the option has long been seemed as unviable, but with Russia’s failure to reach long-
term transit agreements, the NEGP has gained in importance and take on special significance.
The outside option to bypass both of the transiters gives Russia a great strategic advantage in
bargaining.
The conflict between Russia and its transiters urged other gas producers from the Former Soviet
region to seek ways to export their gas to Europe. Besides Russia, a number of Central Asian, i.e.
Caspian, Republics possess significant gas reserves and could export over 130bcm/a.14 The largest
producer, Turkmenistan, could supply up to 100bcm/a. In Soviet times Russia added Caspian
gas to its export. The milder climate conditions of Caspian fields give an advantage of cheaper
production, in comparison with most of Russian fields situated in the permafrost terrain. After
1996 gas demand in Europe fell and to secure its profit Russia squeezed the export of Caspian
gas. Russia blocked the access to export pipelines, leaving Caspian producers to sell their gas to
neighboring Republics. Gas production of Turkmenistan fell more than twice. Now, the Republic
was selling 30bcm/a to Ukraine to meet the demand not covered by gas import from Russia. When
Ukraine was unable to pay for import, Turkmenistan simply cut its deliveries. This has put Russia
into troubles, as Ukraine has started taking lacking gas from the export pipelines.15 To relieve itself
from the increased burden of import to Ukraine, Russia signed an agreement with Turkmenistan
to buy its gas to sell it to Ukraine. Yet, Turkmenistan and other Caspian producers preferred
to ensure more stable supply. As the demand in Europe has recovered, Caspian producers has
intended to export their gas to the European market.
To reach the European market, Caspian producers have to bypass Russia. Two pipeline projects
were proposed to deliver Caspian gas to Turkey, Iran and further to Europe. The Trans-Caspian
Pipeline project, TCP , has been design to export Turkmen gas via Turkey and Greece to Italy.
The pipeline should run through the two transit countries, i.e. Azerbaijan and Georgia. Another
pipeline, Nabucco was planned to pass Iran and again via Turkey enter the European market.
With the independent access to the European market, the Caspian producers will become com-
petitors of Russia. The competition will have a negative effect on Russia’s export profits. Hence,
the formation of the Caspian gas supply chain will exert negative externalities on Russia’s supply
chains, that is on Russia’s and its transiters payoffs. To mitigate the effect, Russia signed a coop-
erative agreement with Turkmenistan to increase import of Turkmen gas and thus, to prevent the
rival’s entry on the market.
As Russia put efforts to turn Caspian gas away from an alternative path, Turkey, European buyers
14For comparison in the next decade, given the fields under development, Russia will be able to export from 150
to 180 bcm/a. Further details see Observatoire Mediterraneen de L’Energie (2003).
15There are a number of storages of Russian gas on the territory of Ukraine. When the Turkmen export was cut,
Ukraine seized the missing gas from the storages.
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and United States were pushing the realization of the Nabucco and Trans-Caspian pipelines.16 The
importers consider the pipelines as an instrument to lessen the market power of Russia. The Caspian
producers would like to install the pipeline to improve their bargaining position with Russia and
achieve higher profits. Every other pipeline strengthens the position of Caspian producers increasing
competition among transiters, i.e. Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Iran.
The options to bypass Russia have already given benefits. In January 2005 Turkmenistan signed
a new agreement with Russia, which guarantees the drastic growth of Turkmen gas export from 30
bcm/a to 80 bcm/a. Though the prices are still negotiated, it was agreed, that they will be pegged
to the European gas prices. A cooperative supply deal is of particular interest for Russia. Turning
Turkmen gas away from Turkish path and directing it through its territory Russia will mitigate
negative externalities of the competing link. Moreover, with the help of Turkmen gas Russia will
be able to serve its export contracts without developing of the new expensive fields, e.g. Yamal
situated in permafrost terrain. Hence, the cooperation enhances the supply efficiency and will
confer a higher profit to Russia. The cooperative agreement seems to be a lucrative alternative for
Turkmenistan too. Difficulties of cooperation with transiters are to be resolved during the Trans-
Caspian and Nabucco project realization. Azerbaijan is in the war with the neighboring Armenia,
while Georgia is on the state of the civil war. The conflict between USA and Iran may complicate
the financing process of the Nabucco pipeline.
To sum up the information on players, pipelines and investment options for the Eurasian gas
supply network see the map on the Figure 1. The existing system of pipelines is marked by the
heavy lines. It passes through the territories of Ukraine and Byelorussia and may bring Russian and
the Caspian gas to the Western Europe. Therewith we highlight Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine
and Byelorussia as players. The projects acknowledged as possible options to extend the network
drawn by dash lines. Therewith, we add Azerbaijan, Georgia and Iran as players. Recall, the
Caspian pipelines allow for gas export bypassing Russia, so we will further refer to two prospective
competing coalitions of the network as Russian and Turkmenian, by names of the producers essential
for each coalition. Note, that the externalities discussed above is related to the formation of these
coalitions, for supply profits depend on the players joining a rival coalition and resources at their
disposal.
3 The model
A set of players involved in the network is N = {.., i, ..}, where |N | = n is the total number
of players. For the Eurasian gas network N = {r, t, u, b, a, i} consists of Russia, Turkmenistan,
16While Europe and USA, are interested in intensifying a competition on the European market, Turkey seeks for
gaining profit from reexport or transit. For the history of the project appearance, its motivation, parameters and
associated conflicts among the countries involved see Nabiev (2003).
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Ukraine, Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, and Iran respectively. The players form coalitions Sk ⊆ N . The
set of terminal coalitions P = {.., Sk, ..} is called a partition, or a coalition structure, where P ∈
P a set of all possible partitions.17 We assume coalitions embedded in any partition are pairwise
disjoined Sk ∩ Sh = ∅ for all k 6= h and
⋃|P |
k=1 Sk = N . If all the players play non-cooperatively, the
partition is presented by a set of singletons P = {.., {i}, ..}. When all the players cooperate, i.e.
form one coalition P = {N} we say a grand coalition forms.
Hereafter, we assume, that transfers are allowed within coalitions, but not across coalitions.
Members of each coalition play cooperatively and act as to maximize total profit of the coalition,
while coalitions play non-cooperatively.18 Therewith, for every coalition we define a function, which
assigns a worth to a coalition given the entire partition:
w : 2N ×P→ R
(S;P ) 7→ w(S;P )
The function is determined on the set of all possible partitions and is called a partition function.
A pair (N,w) presents a game in a partition function form. The outcome of the game is the payoff
vector and equilibrium coalition structure (ψ, P ). The components of ψ ∈ Rn are the individual
payoffs ψi. The game in partition function form allows to capture the presence of externalities
and exhibit how the worth of a coalition changes with a coalition structure. Formally speaking
externalities are present whenever:
∃S : w(S;P ) 6= w(S;P ′) , for P 6= P ′Sj = (1)
there is at least one coalition, which worth changes with the change in a partition. When the
inequality sign turns for ”greater”, the externalities are negative. If the inequality sign is ”less”,
the externalities are positive.
Bargaining and coalition formation To solve the game is to find an equilibrium coalition
structure and expected payoffs of the players. We use the axiomatic solution proposed by Maskin
(2003). This solution is based on the notion of random order bargaining developed by Weber (1988).
The game is conceived as a sequential process. Players enter the game one by one in an order θ ∈ Θ,
where Θ : |Θ| = |N |! is a set of all possible permutations of N . Orders of players are assumed
equally probably Pr(θ) = 1‖N |!. Upon entering a player may join to one of the existing coalitions
or start a new one. Depending on allocation of the player is assigned a payoff. When the next player
enters, the allocation and the payoffs of all the previous players are known. We consider the game
17In general case, the total number of partitions, in which n players may be organized forming k coalition is given
by the Stirlings numbers of the second kind Skn: |P| =
∑n
k=1
Skn =
∑n
k=1
1
k!
∑k
t=0
(−1)k−tCtktn.
18The assumption was first formally introduced by Ray and Vohra (1996) and justified by Bloch (1996), and become
a part of a formal description of partition function form games since then.
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with complete information, so that profits of coalitions are also common knowledge. The expected
payoff of a player and the probability distribution of equilibrium partitions can be obtained as a
randomization over θ.
Formally, the approach can be described as follows. A player i enters the game and observes a
coalition structure P formed by his predecessors j : θ(j) < θ(i). If the player joins coalition S ∈ P
we write PS∪i. If the player sets a new coalition, then P− > P ∪{i} = P{i}. Decisions on allocation
are irreversible. For simplicity, we will omit the subscript of the partition on the next step referring
to that new partition again as P . Given the allocation, the player obtains a corresponding payoff
ψi(P, θ).
The following axioms of Maskin (2003) provide an algorithm to assign players to coalitions and
to determine their payoffs:
(i) the sharing of joint profits within every coalition should be Pareto optimal
∑
i∈S
ψi(P, θ) = w(S;P ) for ∀i, S ∈ P (2)
(ii) each player is allocated to the coalition S, to which his gross marginal contribution is greatest
w(S ∪ i;PS∪i)− w(S;PS′∪i) ≥ w(S′′ ∪ i;PS′′∪i)− w(S′′;PS∪i) (3)
∀S′′ : S′′ 6= S S′ = argmax
S′′
[w(S′′ ∪ i;PS′′∪i)− w(S′′;PS∪i)]
(iii) every player earns his opportunity wage, or stays with his ”stand alone” value
ψi(P, θ) = max[w(S′ ∪ i;PS′∪i)− w(S′;PS∪i), w({i};P{i})] (4)
(iv) the equilibrium vector of payoffs ψ∗(θ) and the partition P ∗(θ) should be consistent, that is
for the partitions P such that ∀S ∈ P ∃S′ ∈ P (θ) : S ⊆ S′ if i is allocated according to (ii),
then
ψ∗i (θ) = ψi(P, θ)
In words, the axioms mean the following. The first axiom requires, that coalitions distribute their
profits fully among their members. This condition is sometimes called ”budget-balancing” and was
justified by Aumann and Dreze (1974). The second axiom ensures, that a player gives his resources
to a coalition, which benefits from them at most. The axiom also poses the incentives for coalitions
to bid for the player. According to (iii) each player gets his highest alternative payoff. Thus, the
axiom implies incentives for the player to join the coalition and exposes the value of an outside
option. The last axiom refers to sequential rationality and sub-game perfectness, and implies the
backward induction.
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Altogether the axioms present the algorithm to solve the game. One can determine the vector of
payoff and a partition (ψ∗(θ), P ∗(θ)) for all possible orderings Θand then, calculate the expected
payoff vector
ψi =
∑
θ∈Θ
1
|N |! · ψ
∗
i (θ) (5)
with 1/|N |! - the probability of every ordering. Similarly one can draw the probability distribution
for the equilibrium partition.
In general, a subgame perfect equilibrium allocation satisfying (ii) may not exist or may not be
unique. Yet, for the case of two producers the following proposition is true:
Partition function To solve the game numerically we have to define how the values to partition
function are determined. The values of the partition function are defined on the terminal coalition
structures. Coalitions are suppliers on the market and play non-cooperatively. We define the worth
of a coalition w(S;P ) as the maximum profit, the coalition may earn given the actions of the other
coalitions on the market. Within a coalition players combine their resources, let ki is the resources
of the player i and kS =
∑
i∈S ki are the resources of the coalition S. In terms of the gas supply
network, resources are the pipelines. Every transiter owns one pipeline, we will denote by |ki| the
capacities along particular pipeline and by |kS | the total transport capacity of the coalition. We
assume, that supply coalitions compete on quantities and define the worth of coalitions by the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium:
w(S;P ) = max
qS
piS(qS1 , .., qS , .., qSm) (6)
the quantity qS can not exceed the capacity of the coalition, therefore the coalition may will to invest
in capacity over |kS |. How much the coalition will invest and supply depends on the parameters of
the profit function, which is expressed as follows:
piS = p(qS)qS − tc(qS)− I · (qS − |kS |) (7)
p(q) is the inverse demand function, tc(q) - total cost of supply, and I denotes the investment
capacity costs. We refer to a one shot game, so the expression (7) implies, that the equilibrium
capacity of a coalition is equal to the quantity q∗S = |k∗S |.
Recall, the values of the partition function are calculated for the terminal coalition structure on
the market. This will allow us to determine the allocation of the last player and his payoff. To
find the allocation and payoffs of the players entering the game earlier we need to know the values
of coalitions for intermediate partitions of the players. The values of the partition function for
Sk ∈ P : ∪kSk < N are redefined as follows:
w(S;P ) = w(ST ;P T )−
∑
i∈ST \S
ψi(P T , θ)
for all S ∈ P and ST ∈ P T : S ⊆ ST
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here the superscript T means terminal. In words, the value of a coalition S, which is the predecessor
of ST , is the profit of ST reduced by the payoffs to the players i: θ(i) > θ(j) for j ∈ ST ∩ S and
i ∈ ST \ S.
Having the game defined in general terms, we proceed with the quantitative assumptions on p(q),
tc(q), and I to solve the game numerically.
4 Quantitative assumptions
Demand The market, we have in mind, is represented by the core members of the European
Union – EU15.19 We refer to these countries as Western Europe. In absolute figures the gas
consumption in Western Europe by the year of 2020 is expected to reach 625bcm/a. Of this
quantity about 30% might be covered by the domestic production of the countries. The rest
Qim =420bcm/a have to be imported.20 Algeria, Norway, the African Republics, and the Former
Soviet Union are the main gas exporters for the Western Europe.
For the analysis of the Eurasian gas supply, we have to distinguish the demand for the Former
Soviet Union gas. A few obstacles prevent us from modelling the competition among the exporters
and estimating the demand function explicitly. Exporters sign long-term contracts with buyers
setting the price and quantities for the periods of 15 to 25 years. Buyer may negotiate a new
contract with a supplier only after the previous one is expired. At that time, the contracts with
the other suppliers may still be valid. Moreover, export contracts are confidential on their nature.
One can reveal the quantities to be exported through the capacities installed, but the information
on the prices is missing.
We propose to estimate the demand for gas of the Former Soviet Republics based on the infor-
mation on capacities and marginal costs of all exporters. As a rule, gas producers export their gas
up to the capacity limit.21 For every capacity level, producers have different marginal cost. We use
the data on costs and capacities from Observatoire Mediteranen de L’Energie(2003), see Appendix
2, to build an aggregate supply function S(p). We arrange the producers by costs, starting with
the cheapest one. In this row the next most expensive producer after Russia is LNG producing
Oman. Then, we assume market clearing mechanism S(p) = Qim, for Qim is exogenously given.
Thus, producers bid the reservation price equal to their marginal cost plus some mark-up and and
sell gas at market clearing price. Under the reservation price producers sell gas up to their capacity
or up to demand.
19EU15 includes Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. We look at the market formed by these countries as a whole,
without specifying demand for each individual country.
20We take the figures for the consumption presented by International Gas Union Report (2006).
21Source: Observatoire Mediteranen de L’Energie(2003), see Appendix 2
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Figure 2: Gas supply curve
We assume a linear form of the inverse residual demand function: p(q) = α − βq for FSU gas.
Taking the quantity q−FSU set by the cheaper producers as a given, we find p(q) as the residual
demand. We calibrate the demand function given the condition p(q = 0) = pLNG). This implies a
20% mark-up.22 Finally, we obtain α =175$/tcm and β is equal to 0.30. Hence, for a prospective
export of 140bcm/a the price of the Former Soviet Union gas will be about 130$/tcm.
Given the parameters of the inverse demand function we obtain the price elasticity of demand
ε = −2.6 for the optimal supply level for the grand coalition 160bcm/a. The quite elastic demand
reflects the flexibility of the European buyers in the choice of a producer in the long-run. The
exporters are tight by the contracts in the short term, but they compete in the long term perspective.
The obtained elasticity is close by the value to the estimates for the European market provided by
Boots, Rijkers, and Hobbs (2004).
Production costs Production cost are the costs of gas extraction and depend on terrain, climate
conditions as well as infrastructure on place. The costs vary with fields and specified for each
producer individually. Let the producers allocate gas production as to minimize their costs. This
implies an increasing function for the marginal production cost, which we assume to be linear
mc(q) = m + c · q. For Russia, we estimate the slope parameter using data on the production
cost change with the increase in export quantities.23 We find cr=0.4, where the subscript refers to
Russia as the producer. The intercept is taken to be equal to the cost of the field preservation. For
Russian old depleting fields, like Medvegje it is declared about mr=15$/tcm.
22Note, we refer to the European border prices and do not reckon mark-ups of the distributors. Gas prices are opt
to follow oil prices. In our estimations we reflect this relation by putting the restriction for the gas price at the oil
price level.
23”Strategy for the Russian gas industry development” (2004) provides the data on cost raises given the export
increases in Russia.
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As for Turkmenistan, it claims that the price Russia pays for Turkmen gas reflects its production
cost plus a normal return. Given the norm stay the same over the time, one can take the changes in
price to be equal to the change in marginal costs. Then, we obtain ct=0.35. The milder climate of
the Caspian region, as opposed to that of Siberian permafrost region, results in lower preservation
cost for Turkmenistan mt=10$/tcm.
Finally, if the producers cooperate, they will combine their fields. Assuming, that they minimize
joint production cost, we derive the joint marginal cost function: mcrt = 11 + 0.3q for q ≥ 14bcm
and mrt = mt, crt = ct if the smaller quantities are exported.
Transportation costs Transportation costs account for operation costs and gas losses. These
costs depend on the length of a pipeline and specific features of the track. The operation cost
imply expenses mm on management and maintenance of pipelines and compressor stations. The
gas losses present the per cent of gas g utilized by compressors on pumping to keep the pressure
in pipelines. The both cost components are proportional to distance d. For the onshore pipeline
the loss factor is g = 0.25% of gas per 100km, for the high pressure underwater pipelines the
figure is doubled g = 0.5%.24 The maintenance costs also differ for onshore and offshore pipeline:
mm = 0.1$/tcm · 100km and mm = 0.2$/tcm · 100km, respectively.
Total supply costs The total cost of gas supply includes production and transportation costs.
We derive a simplified formula of total cost: 25
tc(qS) =
∑
i∈S
((
mmi
gi
+
∫ qS
0
mcj(q))egi·di − mmi
gi
)qi (9)
transport cost parameters are specified for a particular pipeline. In our case every pipeline is
associated with one player i, so we spare on indexes and put i to denote the pipeline. The marginal
production costs imply a particular producer j.
Investment cost In the previous paragraphs we dealt with annual cost figures, but investment
costs of pipeline projects are usually given in total. To annualize investment we use the following
formula: Ii = r·I¯i(1−(1+r)−t) , where I¯i is the total investment per capacity. We take the real interest
rate for investment to be r = 0.15. The approximate lifetime of pipes is t = 25 years.
We distinguish two types of investment projects: projects to increase capacity of an installed
pipeline and projects to build a new pipeline. The first type of projects include installation of extra
24See Oil, gas and coal supply outlook (1995) for further explanations of the transportation technology.
25We take, that the total cost of supply should include all the expenses on the way:
tc(q, d+4)− tc(q, d)
4d = mm+ g · tc(q, d) (8)
We solve the differentiation equation and substitute the production cost for the cost at zero distance. For further
details see Hubert, Ikonnikova (2004).
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compressor stations and can be completed within months. As for a new pipeline, it might take two
or three years, before the pipeline goes into operation and can deliver gas. To take this delay into
account we add a multiplier (1 + r) to the investment cost of new pipelines: (1 + r)Ii. We present
Table 1: Description of the links
Linka capacity investment cost distance supply cost countries, forming
kl[bcm/a] Il[$/tcm] d[100km] tc(1tcm)[$] a supply chain
Souyz 70 sunk 16 17.2 Russia, Ukraine
Yamal1 28 sunk 16 17.2 Russia, Byelorussia
Upgrade 15 7.7 16 17.2 Russia, Ukraine
Yamal2 ∞ 15.2 16 17.2 Russia, Byelorussia
NEP∗ ∞ 24.9 16 17.2 Russia
TCP∗ 30 23.7 38 15.0 Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan
Nabucco∗ 30 23.7 38 15.0 Turkmenistan, Iran
aWe mark with a star the projects of new pipelines
the figures for supply and investment costs for the investment options under the consideration in
the table1. The first two rows of the table describe the existing pipelines in Ukraine and Belarus.
Their capacities are fixed and investment costs are sunk. The next two links are the extension of
the first two pipelines: Upgrade of Ukrainian pipeline system and the second band of the Yamal
project. These two investment projects are the cheapest investment options, as one may see from
the second column of figures. To organize supply through the pipelines in Ukraine and Belorus,
Russia is required.
The technology of pipelines implies some economies of scale. The economies of scale appears
thanks to the existing infrastructure. Thus, it is cheaper to extend a pipeline or lay a pipeline
parallel to the existing track, than to build a pipeline opening a new path. Onshore pipelines are
cheaper to build than offshore pipelines due to the installation difficulties. Another reason for high
investment cost is the length of track. As the result the last three pipelines are the most expensive
ones.
As one can see from the second column, we fix the capacities of the TCP, Upgrade and Nabucco
projects. If more capacity to be added, the extension of the rest of the connected transmission
network (e.g. the complement pipelines in East Europe and Turkey) will be required. This will
lead to increase in projects’ costs. In contrast, the Yamal2 and NEGP directly join with the
European gas network. Europe is assumed to adjust the internal grid to the import needs on its
own, no restrictions are put on the pipelines going direct to the EU border.
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5 Results
5.1 Partition function
We substitute the demand, supply, and investment cost parameters into the profit function (7) and
calculate the values of the partition function. Recall, the values of the partition function show
the profit, which the players of a given coalition can achieve playing against the outside coaltiions.
The coalitions are involved into the Cournot competition. In addition, we determine the capacities
installed by the coalitions and obtain the quantities delivered to the market. In the table 2 we
Table 2: Production plans, prices, profits
partition capacity on links bcm/a price profita % of total
Uold Yam1 Yam2 Uup NEGP TCP Nab $/tcm $bn
{{r}, {t}, ..} - - - - 130 - - 136 8.7 65%
{{r}, {t, a, i}, ..} - - - - 113 30 30 124 6.5; 4.4 49%; 33%
{{r, t}, ..} - - - - 150 - - 130 10.3 77%
{{r, b}, {t}..} - 28 112 - 0 - - 133 10.4 78%
{{r, b}, {t, a, i}..} - 28 94 - 0 30 30 120 8.1; 4.2 60%; 31%
{{r, t, b}, ..} - 28 132 - 0 - - 130 12.2 91%
{{r, u}, {t}..} 70 - - 15 45 - - 136 10.7 80%
{{r, u}, {t}..} 70 - - 15 - - - 150 9.6 72%
{{r, u}, {t, a, i}..} 70 - - 15 27 30 30 124 8.5; 4.4 63%; 33%
{{r, t, u}, ..} 70 - - 15 65 - - 130 12.3 92%
{{r, b, u}, {t}..} 70 28 27 15 0 - - 133 11.6 87%
{{r, b, u}, {t, a, i}..} 70 28 9 15 0 30 30 124 9.2; 4.1 69%; 30%
{N} 70 28 47 15 0 0 0 127 13.4 100%
aIf two coalitions {S1, S2} in the partition earn non zero profit, we give the profits of these coalitions respectively
piS1 ; piS2
give the profits of the essential coalitions, i.e. the coalitions including at least one producer. The
equilibrium capacities of the coalitions are given with respect to the investment projects available.
We use the sign ”-” to mark the pipelines, which are not available. The complete table of coalitional
profits with respect to availability of pipelines is presented in the Appendix 3.
The figures in the table reveal the significance of some pipelines. When the producers stay
separate and do not cooperate with any of the transiters, Russia earns 65% of the grand coalition
profit investing in the Baltic pipeline. The comparison of the first and the second rows shows, that
NEGP pipeline brings 1.6bn more if the producers cooperate. The greater the profit the producers
can earn on their own, the smaller the contribution of the transiters into the profit of the grand
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coalition and the less their payoff. Given, that NEGP project is available the share of the transiters
is limited by 23%. Hence, Russia gains a strong bargaining position with the transiters keeping
NEGP as an outside option.
If the cooperation of Russia with Turkmenistan fell through, the competition with Turkmenistan
and the loss of more efficient production fields would reduce the profit of Russia by almost a half. On
the one hand, this reduction is the contribution of the Turkmenistan to a coalition with Russia, on
the other hand, the significance of TCP and Nabucco projects for the Caspian producer. Whatever
the coalition structure forms, if the Caspian players cooperate and can build TCP and Nabucco,
their stand alone value guarantees them at least 30$ of the grand coalition profit. If the projects of
the Caspian pipelines are abandoned, contribution of Turkmenistan is determined by the synergy.
The Caspian transiters can earn nothing. Thus, TCP and Nabucco grant the Caspian players a
strategic advantage in bargaining with Russia and the other transiters.
One should note, that the positions of Ukraine and Belorus as well as Azerbaijan and Iran depend
on their complementarity to the producers. The more capacities a transiter has, the greater his
contribution, the higher his payoff. Thus, due to the capacity constraint, 70bcm/a plus 15bcm/a,
Ukraine loses in comparison with Belorus more than 1bn. Furthermore, the value of capacities de-
pends on the substitutable capacities available. For instance, the Upgrade and the Yamal pipelines
lose a large part of their value in the presence of NEGP, TCP, and Nabucco pipelines.
Robustness of results The relative values of the coalitions do not change significantly if the
quantitative parameters of our model change in the range of 10%. We compare the per cent of the
grand coalition profit, which coalitions earn, for different values of the demand intercept α =160,
175, 190 and the slope β = 0.3, 0.35. We find that the change in profit values of the grand coalition
does not exceed 2.5%. We have also checked, how the figures in the last column of the table
will change if the slope of the unit production function for producers will change by 0.05, so that
cr = 0.45, 0.35 and ct = 0.25, 0.35. Lower production costs will increase the profit of grand coalition
to 14.1bn. Yet, the profit of different coalitions in per cent does not change. The increase in the
production cost, will lead to lower absolute figures. The profit of the rand coalition will be 12.8bn.
Under the competition, supply coalition with Russia and Turkmenistan will earn 8.6bn and 3.9bn,
respectively. However, the relative the contributions the players will remain the same.
5.2 Strategic value of pipelines
In this section, we proceed with the analysis of the strategic value of the investment options.26
In particular, we study, how the possibility to build various pipelines affects the bargaining power
26All the calculations were make using the Mathematica 5.1 software, produced by Wolfram research. The files
with results can by inquired from the author.
18
of players. We show how investments in the development of the network are not based on the
cost analysis, but made for strategic reasons. We interpret shares of players in the total profit as
bargaining power. Then, we assess the strategic value of a pipeline by the change in the players’
shares. To pick out the value of a particular pipeline, we calculate expected payoffs of the members
of the Eurasian gas supply network changing the availability of different investment options. The
Table 3: Payoffs and bargaining power w.r.t. availability of pipelines
a
status quo + Upgrade + Yamal2 + NEGP + TCP + TCP&Nab
Russia 5907 51% 6372 52% 7636 57% 10706 84% 5267 42% 4646 36%
Turkmenistan 286 3% 358 3% 645 5% 803 6% 1468 12% 2374 19%
Ukraine 3845 33% 4309 35% 1827 14% 872 7% 3361 27% 2872 22%
Byelorussia 1449 13% 1317 10% 3177 24% 349 3% 1262 10% 1089 9%
Azerbaijan 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1182 9% 905 7%
Iran 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 905 7%
all - Upgrade - Yamal2 - NEG - TCP - TCP&Nab
Russia 8917 67% 8833 67% 8573 66% 5985 45% 9938 74% 11144 83%
Turkmenistan 1961 15% 1959 15% 1928 15% 2161 16% 1400 10% 868 6%
Ukraine 747 5% 661 5% 1008 8% 1866 14% 737 6% 727 5%
Byelorussia 642 5% 703 5% 304 2% 2010 15% 673 5% 658 5%
Azerbaijan 560 4% 558 4% 579 4% 688 5% 630 5 % 0 0%
Iran 560 4% 558 4% 579 4% 688 5% 0 0% 0 0%
aDemand function has intercept 175 and slope 0.3
results of our computations are presented in the table 3. The table consists of two parts. In the
upper part we look at changes in bargaining power changes when investment options are added
by ont at a time. We start with the ”status quo” variant, with only existing pipelines available.
In the lower part of the table we consider the effect of removal of investment options. The first
variant ”all” implies, that all known investment projects are available. By the name of the variant
we designate, which investment option is added or removed. In each variant, for every player, we
give two figures: an expected payoff in mln/a, and a share in a total profit in per cent.
The two parts of the table present two perspectives on bargaining. The ”status quo” variant is
a short-run perspective of sharing, the zero point of the bargaining, when only existing capacities
are taken into account. In a long-term sharing perspective, the players have to take into account
pipelines, which can be built. In the ultimate case, ”all” the investment projects are to be included
into consideration. The comparison of ”status quo” and ”all” variants reveals the difference in the
shortsight and farsight view on the bargaining. It highlights the value of the portfolio of pipeline
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projects for the players. Though one may ague, that the true values are somewhat in between.
At present gas producers depend entirely on the transport capacities of Ukraine and Byelorussia.
Therefore, Russia yields to the transiters almost a half of gas export profits. Between the transiters
this half is shared according to their capacities. Thus, Ukraine has more than twice as much capacity
as Byelorussia and obtains more than two times greater share. In contrast, if the investment options
to extend the network are accounted, the picture changes significantly. In the ”all” the producers
gain 25% in power, while transiters, increased in number, lose their advantage. The transiters are
left with less than 20% of the profit of the grand coalition.
Recall, the Upgrade is the most efficient investment option and may increase the network capacity
by 15bcm/a. Comparing the figures in ”+ Upgrade” and ”status quo” columns one can see, that
the option brings a slight shift in the profit sharing. Ukraine strengthens its bargaining position by
2% at the expense of Belorus. The option does not affect the positions of Russia and Turkmenistan.
The strategic role of the Upgrade is also negligible in the context of all the other options included.
It is a small change in figures between ”all” and ”- Upgrade”. Hence, the withdrawal of the
option does not change the balance of bargaining power. Ukraine loses less than 1% and keeps its
position, so do the others. The Upgrade project turns out to be of no importance to the players of
the network.
The strategic value of Y amal project is a bit different. If the option is added to status quo, it
strengthens the bargaining position of Belorus with respect to Ukraine. Belorus enjoys 11% incre-
ment in its share, while Ukraine loses 19%. The increased substitutability between the transiters
grants the producers with 8% of the profit. However, the strategic value of the option decreases
if it is considered in the context of all the options. Russia loses 1%, as Ukraine loses 2% at cost
of Russia and Belorus. Thus, the investment in Yamal2 gives a moderate strategic advantage to
Belorus only. Therefore, Russia does not show much interest in the extension of the track.
In contrast to the Yamal and Upgrade projects, the appearance of the North European Gas
pipeline changes the bargaining situation dramatically. Recall, that the pipeline has long been
seen to be inefficient. Yet, it allows Russia to bypass its transiters and thus, to damage their
bargaining position. Russia increases its share in the profit by 2/3, the share of the transiters
will decrease to 10%. The great impact of NEGP on the balance of bargaining power can also be
observed in the lower table. If the option were abandoned, Russia would lose 1/3 of its payoff,
that is almost $3bn would be redistributed between its transiters. So, the gain in power and in the
expected payoff explains why Russia considers the NEGP as a highly beneficial project. Though
it looks inefficient in comparison with the Upgrade and Yamal2, it brings more profit, than these
two projects together.
So, far we have not seen a significant change in the share of Turkmenistan. It keeps its weak
position vis-a-vis Russia, as long as it cannot market its gas, but through Russia. Yet, the appear-
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ance of the TCP and Nabucco pipelines bring a tremendous shift in the position of the Caspian
producer. As the NEGP for Russia, the pipelines bypassing Russia and opening an access to the
European market are of great importance for Turkmenistan. Its share, together with the payoff,
jumps in almost 10 times from $285mln to $2374mln on ”status quo” background. The threat to be
involved in additional competition makes Russia give up a part of its profit. Thus, the possibility
to supply its gas independently of Russia increases the share of Turkmenistan by 9%, if one and by
16% if the both pipelines are presented. At the same time, Ukraine and Belorus also forfeit a part
of their profit to the new transiters. The strategic value of the Caspian pipelines is considerable
in the context of ”all” the options too. Altogether the Caspian players gain a 17% advantage in
bargaining with Russia thanks to the TCP and Nabucco pipelines. This explains why the Caspian
players have expressed eagerness to develop the project of new pipelines, which even less efficient
than the pipeline through the Baltic sea.
Equilibrium partition Besides expected payoffs to the players we determine the equilibrium
partition of players into coalitions. We find, the grand coalition always forms if the players have
”status quo” plus one more investment option for supply. This result is a collection of several
finding. First, any transiter prefers to join a coalition of the complement producer. In general,
the gross marginal contribution of a player to a coalition with higher complementarity is greater,
than the contribution of the player to any rival coalition. The complement coalitions gets the
advantage in competition and becomes more efficient (or less capacity constraint). The rival gain is
the advantage in competition, as a coalition playing against him reduces its supply possibilities. For
instance, if Belorus joins {t, a, i} Russia loses 1.6bn while the profit of the Caspian players increases
by only 0.2bn. If Azerbaijan and Iran join Russia, Turkmenistan loses 4.4bn, when Russia gains
only 2.2bn. Like transiters, producers join the transiters with higher degree of complementarity.
Furthermore, as the cooperation gives the producers a monopoly position (with respect to the
residual demand) and allows to enjoy the cost reduction in production, the producers are opt to
stay in one coalition. Compiling the two conclusions one would expect, that the grand coalition
will form in equilibrium.
A more interesting result is observed for the ”all” minus some investment option variants. We
obtained, that the grand coalition forms only in ”-NEGP” and ”-TCP,Nabucco” variants. With
the probability Pr({N}) =0.98 the grand coalition forms in ”all” and ”-TCP” variant, with
Pr({N}) =0.99 in ”-Upgrade”, and with Pr({N}) =0.82 in ”-Yamal2”. Except the last case,
the coalition structure which forms with the probability 1− Pr({N})is {{a, i}, {r, t, b, u}}. In the
variant ”-Yamal2” with the probability 0.17 the equilibrium partition is {{t, a, i}, {r, t, b, u}}.
The formation of multi-coalition partitions can be interpreted as follows. In the ”all” and ”-
Upgrade” variants the position of Russia in the competition with Turkmenistan is weak. On the
one hand, Russia is eager to increase the payoff to Turkmenistan in order to avoid the competition.
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On the other hand, if Turkmenistan steps in the game after the Caspian transiters, he would have
to give them a share of w({t, a, i}; {{t, a, i}, {r, b, u}}), which would make his payoff smaller, than
his contribution to w({r, b, u}; {{t, a, i}, {r, b, u}}). Therefore, Azerbaijan, and Iran are left outside
the grand coalition.
If Russia abandons Yamal2 project, it weakens its position in competition with Turkmenistan
at most. The profit of the coalition {t, a, i} exceed the opportunity value of Turkmenistan:
w({r, t, b, u}; {{a, i}, {r, t, b, u}})−w({r, b, u}; {{t, a, i}, {r, b, u}}) < w({t, a, i}; {{t, a, i}, {r, b, u}}).
Therefore, the Caspian players prefer to form a coalition and compete with the supply from Russia,
rather than form the grand coalition.
In the situation when NEGP is not available, Russia has a weak bargaining position with Ukraine
and Belorus. To gain power, Russia would attract to a coalition other players, substitutable to the
two transiters. Thus, the grand coalition will form. As for ”-TCP,Nabucco” variant, Turkmensitan
has no other option, but to join Russia. The Caspian transiters are indifferent, as their contribution
to either coalition is zero. Hence, we may say a grand coalition forms. The situation is quite similar
in the case of ”-TCP”.
5.3 Correspondence with the reality
Our first observation concerns the formation of the grand coalition. At present the players of the
Eurasian gas supply network are succeed in forming the grand coalition, as they are bound by co-
operation agreements. In October 2006 Russia has singed a new agreement with Turkmenistan.27
According to this agreement Turkmenistan will deliver to Russia 50bcm/a in 2007-2009 years on
the price of 100$/tcm. The new agreement was signed after long negotiations and after Turk-
menistan has signed a tentative agreement with the neighbor countries on building TCP and
Nabucco pipelines. The previous price for Turkmen gas was 65$/tcm. Hence, roughly speak-
ing, the appearance of the investment projects of the Caspian pipelines gave Turkmenistan about
1.7bn increase in profit. The same difference in the payoff of Turkmenistan can be observed in the
table 3 if φt for ”status quo” and ”all” are compared. The win in the payoff is a bit smaller, if ”all”
and ”-TCP, Nab” are compared.
In negotiations over the transit contract, Azerbaijan asks Turkmenistan to allow to use the half
of the TCP capacities for its own export. In terms of payoffs, it will mean, that Azerbaijan asks a
half of the profit of the TCP project. Yet, Turkmenistan is ready only for the concession of 1/4.
We obtained, that the profit of the coalition {t, a} is 2.4bn, than 1/4 is about 600mln. Looking at
the table 3, we find, that in the variant ”all” Azerbaijan get the payoff of 560mln.
Another player whose predicted payoff we may compare with the real value is Ukraine. In the
winter 2006 Russia expressed its intentions to reduce its net payments to Ukraine. Ukraine obtains
27See ”The Moscow Times” issue from 26.10.2006.
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26bcm/a of gas as a payment in kind for the transit and it pays Russia for 30bcm exported in
addition annually. Recall, at the same moment the building of NEGP has been started. Russia
would have liked to raise the price for gas exported to Ukraine from 65$/tcm to 230$/tcm. Yet,
after long negotiations the price of 95$/tcm for 2006 and 130$/tcm for 2007 was set. Given the
alternative to supply Ukraine is to supply Europe, we calculate the net payoff to Ukraine reduces
from 5bn to less than 2bn in the year of 2007 and less than 1bn is by 2015 the price of 230$/tcm will
be reached. Note, that though the theoretical ”status quo” payoff seems to be lower, the relative
change is roughly coincides with the reality.
We can not say much about Belorus, as the renegotiations of the current contract are at progress.
Yet, we may note, that Belorus is likely to agree on the increase in price for Russia gas if the gradual
schedule, as for Ukraine, will be developed. It is also difficult to talk about absolute payoff of Russia,
as most of the profit data are confidential. However, the previous remarks on the negotiations of
new contracts with the transiters allow to conclude, that Russia gains with appearance of NEGP
a lot.
6 Conclusions
In general it is difficult to apply the solutions of the partition function form games to real world
analysis. One should be able to calculate the outcomes of the game under all possible contingencies,
the optimization problem of every conceivable sub–coalition of players has to be solved. Moreover,
the number of possible coalitions grows rapidly as the number of players increases. Furthermore,
many of the possible sub–coalitions would have to deal with situations which are very different
from those prevailing in reality. This raises the problem of obtaining data and making predictions
for rather hypothetical situations, which severely limits the practical applicability of most of the
solution concepts.
In the paper we introduce an approach, which can be applied to a wide range of situations.
We test it on the example of the Eurasian gas supply network. Fortunately, in the Eurasian
gas transmission system the number of truly independent players is small and the options of the
various coalitions can be easily derived from the geography of the transmission grid. Furthermore,
the technology of pipeline transportation is fairly straightforward allowing rough estimations of the
cost of the various options. In fact, all projects which have to be considered for the theoretical
analysis have been already proposed in real life in one form or another – often with detailed cost
estimates. In this sense, the Eurasian gas transmission offers a rather unique opportunity to assess
the usefulness and prediction power of the coalitional bargaining model of Maskin (2003) in applied
research.
In the paper we have demonstrated how the bargaining power can be assessed. We have shown
the importance and role of investment decisions both for the future profits and strategic positions
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of the players. Taking into account all options to extend the current transport system we obtain
a reasonable result on the overall distribution of profits in this supply chain. Furthermore, we
quantify the strategic importance of single options. The Upgrade and Yamal2 pipelines, may look
as the most efficient projects to extend the network at first glance. Yet, we find, that these projects
strengthen the positions of the transiters, Ukraine and Belorus, and do not bring any advantage to
the investing party, i.e. Russia. The competition between Belorus and Ukraine is of little strategic
importance compared to an option for direct Russian access to customers. The commercially
unattractive NEGP has a great strategic value. It increases the bargaining power of Russia more
than all other options together. The TCP and Nabucco pipelines, though very expensive, are the
important investment projects too. If the pipelines are built, Turkmenistan can bypass Russia
and supply its gas to the European market. Under the threat of competition, Russia is ready to
increase the payoff to Turkmenistan. Hence, the pipelines contribute to the bargaining power of
the Caspian producer. However, as the cooperation of the producers is profitable for both of them,
the pipelines are not built, but stay as an outside option.
We see a wide range of applications of the methodology introduced. One can use it to estimate
the bargaining power on the electricity market, when the players are generators and operator of
the transmission lines. Following the research of Stole and Zwiebel (1998), one can assess the
bargaining power of workers and firms given the job opportunities presented. The international
environment agreements can be considered as coalition, which countries may form to control the
emissions.
Appendix 1
Here, we define the class of situations, for which the approach of Maskin (2003) gives at least
one equilibrium. Let us introduce some more notation. We will determine the gross marginal
contribution of a player i into coalition Sj given the belief, that otherwise the player will join Sk
as wjk. In terms of the partition function:
wjk := w(Sj ∪ i;PS∪i)− w(Sj ;PSk∪i) (10)
Further, one may construct the quadratic matrixW with elements wjk. The elements of the jth row
of the matrix show what the contribution of the player to the coalition Sj under different believes
about his allocation. The elements of the jth column determine how much every coalition in the
partition loses if the player joins Sj .
Then, the second axiom of allocation of the player to a coalition can be rewritten as follows:
Sj → Sj ∪ i if wjk ≥ wkj for k = argmaxwkj (11)
The game has at least one equilibrium if for every subgame of the game (N,w) exists at least one
Sj satisfying the axiom.
24
Proposition: (Sufficient condition) A subgame perfect equilibrium (ψi, P ) exists if there exist
two coalitions Sj , Sk ∈ P such that
k = argmaxwkj and j = argmaxwjk (12)
in words, it means, that in the partition, there are two coalitions, each of which loses at most if
the player is allocated to the other of two.
Proof: As k = argmaxwkj then we compare wjk with wkj when decide whether the player will
be allocated to Sj . If wjk ≥ wkj , then we find the equilibrium allocation and can assign a payoff. If
wjk < wkj , then the player is allocated to Sk, because j = argmaxwjk and we compare the same
figures.
The condition of the proposition holds for any game with n ≤ 3, as at most two coalitions will
compete for a player. Therefore, the equilibrium of the (N,w) game will exist. An equilibrium also
exists in the game with ≤ 2 essential players. By essential players we mean such players i that
w(S;P ) =
 0 if i ∈ S/w(S;P ) if i ∈ S (13)
The Eurasian gas supply network is an example of the game with the two essential players. The
essential players are the producers, without cooperation with producers transiters will earn zero
profit on the market. Thus, according to the proposition we may say, that in our game at least one
equilibrium always exists.
Appendix 2
Supply cost are calculate with respect to distance to the EU borders. The costs include production
and transportation cost.
Appendix 3
In the table5 there are the profits of essential coalitions, that is the coalitions including producers.
Coalitions without producers earn only zero profit. The profits of coalitions are given with respect
to the investment options available. The first part of the table starts with the variant ”all”. In
this variant all the investment options discussed are available. In every next variant we exclude the
option given in the title from the consideration. Thus, ”-Upgrade” means, that the players can not
invest in the upgrade of the old Ukrainian system. The second part of the table take ”status quo”
variant as a basis. In this variant only existing pipelines are considered. Every next row allows to
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invest in the pipeline marked in the title. For instance, ”+Upgrade” means, that the players can
use 70bcm/a of Ukrainian old system, 28bcm/a of the Yamal1, and invest in the Upgrade with the
capacity of 15bcm/a.
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Table 4: Supply costs and capacities of EU exporters
expoter costa capacity
$/tcm bcm/a
Algeria via Medgaz 39 20
ALGERIA via GME 49 10
ALGERIA via Sardinia-Corsica 49 10
ALGERIA via Transmed 55 24
LIBYA via pipe to Sicily 60 30
IRAQ via Turkey 71 17
NORWAY-North Sea Satellites-Pipe 72 20
IRAN via Turkey 78 11
NORWAY-North Sea -Pipe 79 40
ALGERIA-LNG 87 10
EGYPT LNG 92 25
LIBYA LNG 94 4
QATAR LNG 107 20
NIGERIA LNG 108 19
VENEZUELA-LNG 108 3
TRINIDAD n’ TOBAGO-LNG 108 4
YEMEN LNG 110 4
IRAN LNG 110 5
UAE LNG 111 3
OMAN LNG 114 6
NORWAY-Barents Sea LNG 124 17
aSource: Eni’s Annual Report (2005), Observatoire Mediterraneen de L’Energie (2002), Robert (2003), and
Stern (2006)
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Table 5: Coalitional profits in $bn
{t} {t, a} {t, a, i} ∪{t} {t} {t, a} {t, a, i} ∪{t}
{r} all 8.7; 0 7.5; 2.5 6.5; 4.4 10.3 status quo 0; 0 0; 0 0; 0 0
-Upgrade +Upgrade
-Yamal2 +Yamal2
-NEGP 0; 0 0; 3.6 0; 6.4 6.6 +NEGP 8.7; 0 8.7; 0 8.7; 0 10.3
-TCP 8.7; 0 +TCP 0; 3.6 0; 3.6 3.7
-TCP,Nab 8.7; 0 7.5; 2.5 +TCP,Nab 0; 3.6 0; 6.4 6.6
{r, b} all 10.4; 0 9.2; 2.4 8.0; 4.2 12.2 status quo 4.0; 0 4.0; 0 4.0; 0 4.2
-Upgrade +Upgrade
-Yamal2 9.4; 0 8.2; 2.5 7.2; 4.4 11.0 +Yamal2 10.4; 0 10.4; 0 10.4; 0 12.2
-NEGP +NEGP 9.4; 0 9.4; 0 9.4; 0 11.0
-TCP 10.4; 0 9.2; 2.4 +TCP 3.8; 3.4 3.8; 3.4 7.1a
-TCP,Nab 10.4; 0 10.4; 0 +TCP,Nab 3.8; 3.4 3.5; 5.9 9.3b
{r, u} all 10.7; 0 9.5 ; 2.5 8.5; 4.4 12.3 status quo 8.6; 0 8.6; 0 8.6; 0 9.1
-Upgrade 10.4; 0 9.3; 2.5 8.2; 4.4 12.0 +Upgrade 9.6; 0 9.6; 0 9.6; 0 10.4
-Yamal2 +Yamal2
-NEGP 9.6; 0 8.9; 2.9 8.0; 4.9 10.4 +NEGP 10.4; 0 10.4; 0 10.4; 0 12.0
-TCP 10.7; 0 9.5; 2.5 +TCP 7.9; 3.0 7.9; 3.0 10.9c
-TCP,Nab 10.7; 0 10.7; 0 +TCP,Nab 7.9; 3.0 7.2; 5.1 12.0d
{r, b, u} all 11.6; 0 10.4; 2.4 9.2; 4.2 13.4 status quo 10.6; 0 10.6; 0 10.6; 0 11.5
-Upgrade 11.5; 0 10.2; 2.4 9.1; 4.2 13.3 +Upgrade 11.2; 0 11.2; 0 11.2; 0 12.4
-Yamal2 11.4; 0 10.2; 2.5 9.2; 4.4 13.0 +Yamal2 11.5; 0 11.5; 0 11.5; 0 13.3
-NEGP +NEGP 11.1; 0 11.1; 0 11.1; 0 12.7
-TCP 11.6; 0 10.4; 2.4 +TCP 10.6; 0 9.7; 2.8 9.7; 2.8 12.5e
-TCP,Nab 11.6; 0 11.6; 0 +TCP,Nab 10.6; 0 9.7; 2.8 8.8; 4.6 12.8f
aHere we put the value w({r, t, b, a, i}; {{r, t, b, a, i}, {, u}})
bHere we put the value w({r, t, b, a, i}; {{r, t, b, a, i}, {u}})
cHere we put the value w({r, t, u, a, i}; {{r, t, u, a, i}, {b}})
dHere we put the value w({r, t, u, a, i}; {{r, t, u, a, i}, {b}})
eHere we put the value w(N ; {N})
fHere we put the value w(N ; {N})
30
